Magistrate Judge Lane (Retired)

Magistrate Judge Lane (retired) was born in San Angelo, Texas.  His tenure on the bench began in 1971, as a part-time Magistrate Judge.  In 2003, Judge Lane became a full-time Magistrate Judge.  From 1969 until he became a full-time Magistrate Judge, Judge Lane practiced law in the law firm of Marshall, Hall, McLaughlin & Lane, of San Angelo, Texas.

He is a graduate of the United States Air Force Academy (B.S. 1961), and earned his law degree from the University of Texas School of Law (J.D. 1968).

Judge Lane served our country as a pilot in the United States Air Force.  His chambers are located in Abilene, Texas.

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You Lose Some, You Win Some

Last week, we noted that the Fifth Circuit held that the SEC’s Complaint adequately stated a claim against Mark Cuban for insider trading.  In that case, the SEC filed suit against Cuban in the Northern District of Texas, accusing him of insider trading.  Last week, another decision came out relating to the Cuban case.  This decision (pdf copy available here) was issued by Judge Walton from the District of Columbia, and involves a lawsuit Cuban filed against the SEC seeking certain records pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request relating to purported misconduct at the SEC and an SEC employee who, according to Cuban, used his government e-mail system to harass Cuban.  The decision appears to be largely in Cuban’s favor.

A couple of interesting things to note from the decision:

  1. The decision relates to a December 2008 Freedom of Information Act request by Cuban.  If you need records from the federal government for one of your cases and intend to seek them pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, seek such records as soon as possible.  Otherwise, you might end up receiving them far too late for any use in your case.
  2. There are many governmental records that are exempt from the Freedom of Information Act (the court discusses various exemptions in great detail). 
  3. The SEC sought “three additional years” to review 107 boxes of documents (the court denied this request).  We doubt that the SEC would allow a company being investigated by the SEC to take three years to search through 100 boxes of documents (i.e., a relatively small amount of documents for any complicated civil case these days). 

Cuban was represented in the District of Columbia by David Ross, of Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, and Lyle Roberts, of Dewey & Leboeuf LLP.

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Wal-Mart Wins Dismissal With Prejudice After Filing Successful Rule 12(b)(6) Motion

In a recent order (pdf copy here) in Salinas v. Wal-Mart Stores, Judge Lindsay granted Wal-Mart’s motion to dismiss.  Salinas had sued Wal-Mart, claiming that she slipped and fell in one of Wal-Mart’s Dallas stores, and that Wal-Mart’s negligence was to blame.  Wal-Mart’s motion to dismiss asserted that Salinas’ complaint failed to state a claim because she filed suit more than two years after the incident occurred, and, accordingly, her suit was barred by Texas’ two year statute of limitations for personal injury cases.  Judge Lindsay agreed, finding that Salinas filed her complaint five days late. 

Judge Lindsay noted that Salinas did not file a response to Wal-Mart’s motion to dismiss. 

Wal-Mart was represented by Ramona Martinez and Stacy Hoffman Bruce, both of Cobb Martinez Woodward PLLC.

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Court Sentences Spoliator of Evidence to Two Years in Prison

Occasionally, we discuss non-Northern District of Texas cases of importance to litigators in federal court.  The court’s recent decision (pdf copy here) in Victor Stanley v. Creative Pipe (D. Md.) is one that all litigators should be familiar with.  The court’s decision is notable for at least six reasons.

First, the Court found that the Mark Pappas, the President of Defendant Creative Pipe, committed pervasive and willful violations of several Court orders to preserve and produce electronically stored information (“ESI”), and ordered that he be imprisoned for a period of time not to exceed two years, unless and until he pays to Victor Stanley the attorney’s fees and costs that will be awarded to Victor Stanley as the prevailing party under Rule 37.  The court found that Pappas had committed eight discrete violations:

(1) failed to implement a litigation hold;

(2) deleted ESI soon after [plaintiff] filed suit;

(3) failed to preserve his external hard drive after Plaintiff demanded preservation of ESI;

(4) failed to preserve files and emails after Plaintiff demanded their preservation;

(5) deleted ESI after the Court issued its first preservation order;

(6) continued to delete ESI and used programs to permanently remove files after the Court admonished the parties of their duty to preserve evidence and issued its second preservation order;

(7) failed to preserve ESI when he replaced the [a] server; and

(8) further used programs to permanently delete ESI after the Court issued numerous production orders.

The court’s 89 page decision summarizes the violations in great detail, and concludes by stating:  “Collectively, they constitute the single most egregious example of spoliation that I have encountered in any case that I have handled or in any case described in the legion of spoliation cases I have read in nearly fourteen years on the bench.”

Second, the court noted that Creative Pipe had “acquiesced” in the entry of a default judgment with regard to Victor Stanley’s flagship copyright claim (Victor Stanley basically asserted that Creative Pipe, its competitor, downloaded Victor Stanley’s copyrighted material for use in Creative Pipe’s business).

Third, the court noted that it could initiate criminal contempt proceedings against a party for spoliation of ESI in a civil case.

Fourth, the court painstakingly summarizes spoliation law as it exists in the various circuits, including the potential spoliation sanctions that can be imposed.

Fifth, the court noted that Victor Stanley had requested that the court refer the matter to the United States Attorney to evaluate whether perjury or other criminal charges should be brought against Pappas.  The court noted that this avenue was available to it, but ultimately declined to refer the matter, writing:

I have given serious thought to doing this, because I have concluded that Pappas, and through him, CPI, engaged in multiple willful acts of destruction of evidence and lied under oath in affidavits, deposition testimony, and before the Court during the hearings it held.  Knowing, however, the existing demands on the U.S. Attorney’s office to prosecute very serious crimes, as well as their available resources, I do not think it probable that they would agree to initiate a criminal case arising out of a factually-complicated civil case involving an inordinately voluminous record, and concerning highly technical issues that will necessitate expert testimony.

Sixth, the court found that Pappas had committed civil contempt of court which was established by clear and convincing evidence.  The court’s sanction, as noted above, was that Pappas should be imprisoned for a period of time not to exceed two years, unless and until he pays to Victor Stanley the attorney’s fees and costs that will be awarded to Victor Stanley.  With respect to the sanctions being civil as opposed to criminal, the court stated:

Despite the fact that, if Pappas refuses to pay the attorney’s fees and costs ordered by the Court, he will be imprisoned for two years, it is quite clear that this is a civil—not a criminal—contempt sanction, because the relief is compensatory and the sanction will be imposed to coerce Pappas’s compliance with this Court’s order to pay attorney’s fees and costs to Plaintiff; Pappas can avoid imprisonment by promptly paying the fees and costs.  This result is absolutely essential as a civil contempt sanction because, without it, I am convinced that Pappas will do all that he can to avoid paying any money judgment or award of attorney’s fees that is in the form of a civil judgment alone.  Without the threat of jail time, Pappas’s future conduct would be predicted by his past, and Plaintiff will receive a paper judgment that does not enable it to recover its considerable out-of-pocket losses caused by Pappas’s spoliation. To avoid jail time, all that is required of Pappas is to pay Plaintiff the attorney’s fees and costs that will be awarded to Plaintiff for prevailing on this motion.

Victor Stanley is represented by Randell Ogg, of Bode and Grenier LLP, and Robert  Wolinsky, of Hogan Lovells.

Creative Pipe is currently represented by Jeffrey Orenstein, of Goren, Wolff & Orenstein, and Orenstein LLC, and Joshua Kaufman, of Venable LLP.  (Note that the court specifically remarked that such counsel did not represent Creative Pipe during the times when the conduct resulting in spoliation of evidence took place.)


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Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth Sues Reverend Jack Iker

On September 21, 2010, the Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth (“EDFW”) filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Texas against the Rt. Rev. Jack Leo Iker, who, according to EDFW, “withdraw from The Episcopal Church and pledged his allegiance to a different denomination.”  EDFW claims that Rev. Iker is using EDFW’s service marks in his advertising and marketing of religious services and works, and that individuals may mistakenly believe that Rev. Iker’s religious services are being provided by EDFW.  EDFW asserts causes of action for service mark infringement and dilution under the Lanham Act, and seeks to recover its damages, costs, and attorney’s fees.

EDFW is represented by Jonathan David Fulton Nelson, of Jonathan D. F. Nelson, P.C., and William Sims, Jr., Allen Yee, and Thomas Leatherbury, all of Vinson & Elkins LLP.

The case is before Judge Means.

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File Your Lawsuits Quickly

Judge Boyle, on September 16, 2010, entered a stay in Excentus Corp. v. The Kroger CoExcentus filed its lawsuit in the Northern District against Kroger (asserting infringement of three patents relating to fuel rewards) two hours and six minutes after Kroger sued Excentus in the Southern District of Ohio (seeking a declaratory judgment with respect to the same three patents, as well as additional Excentus patents).  Apparently, the lawsuits followed a break down in licensing discussions between the parties.

Judge Boyle stayed the Northern District lawsuit pursuant to the Fifth Circuit’s “first-to-file” rule, which holds that “when two related cases are pending in two district courts, the court with the later-filed action can refuse to hear the case if the issues raised by both cases ‘substantially overlap.’”  Judge Boyle noted that “[o]nce the court in the later-filed action finds the issues involved are likely to substantially overlap, it is up to the first-filed court to resolve the question of whether both cases should proceed.”

Judge Boyle found that there was substantial overlap between the two actions, despite Excentus amending its complaint to add causes of action for misappropriation and theft of trade secrets, common law misappropriation, and imposition of a constructive trust.  Judge Boyle further found that the “first-to-file” rule applies even where the two suits were filed only hours apart.  And, while Judge Boyle noted that the Fifth Circuit has recognized that the filing of an action for declaratory judgment in direct anticipation of being sued often negates the “first-to-file” rule, this was not a case where Kroger filed the Ohio suit for an “improper or abusive” reason.  Accordingly, Judge Boyle held that the Northern District case would be stayed until the Ohio court determined which action should proceed.

Excentus is represented in this matter by Brett Govett and Karl Dial, both of Fulbright & Jaworski LLPMark Howland, Lon Outland, and Mark Ziegelbein, all of Jones Day, represent Kroger.

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Car Smart, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Denied

Judge Fish, on September 20, 2010, denied Car Smart, Inc.’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in Santander Consumer USA v. Car SmartSantander is an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in Dallas County.  Car Smart is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania.   After removing the case from state to federal court, Car Smart filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Santander’s lawsuit claimed that Car Smart breached a non-recourse dealer retail agreement (the “Agreement”).  Judge Fish provided a nice summary of the law of personal jurisdiction as follows: 

A federal district court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if (1) the long-arm statute of the forum state permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant; and (2) the exercise of such jurisdiction by the forum state is consistent with due process under the United States Constitution.  A defendant is amenable to the personal jurisdiction of a federal court sitting in diversity to the same extent that it would be amenable to the jurisdiction of a state court in the same forum.  Applying state law, this court must first determine whether Texas, the forum state, could assert long-arm jurisdiction.  Because the Texas long-arm statute confers jurisdiction to the limits of the federal constitution, the court need only concern itself with the federal due process inquiry.  

Due process requires the satisfaction of two elements to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant: (1) the nonresident must have some minimum contact with the forum that results from an affirmative act on its part such that the nonresident defendant could anticipate being haled into the courts of the forum state; and (2) it must be fair or reasonable to require the nonresident to defend the suit in the forum state.  The Due Process Clause ensures that persons have a “fair warning that a particular activity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.”

To establish minimum contacts with the forum, a nonresident defendant must do some act by which it “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”  However, the unilateral activity of one asserting a relationship with the nonresident defendant does not satisfy this requirement. . . .

Two types of in personam jurisdiction may be exercised over a nonresident defendant: specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction.  Specific jurisdiction exists if the cause of action is related to, or arises out of, the defendant’s contacts with the forum state and those contacts meet the due process standard.  When a court exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on contacts with the forum related to the particular controversy, the court is exercising ‘specific jurisdiction.  General jurisdiction, on the other hand, may be found when the nonresident’s contacts with the forum are “continuous and systematic,” even though the claim is unrelated to those contacts.

 (citations and quotations omitted).

            Car Smart’s motion basically claimed that it had no connection to Texas.  Notably, Car Smart stated that “it does not have a copy of the ‘alleged’ Agreement[,]” but that “[i]f the Agreement exists, Car Smart negotiated its terms entirely from Pennsylvania and signed it in Pennsylvania.”  (Car Smart’s argument seems to be similar to the ol’ “I didn’t kill him, but, if I did, it was in self-defense” defense.)  Judge Fish rejected Car Smart’s argument, ruling:

By entering into a continuing relationship with Santander, a resident of Texas, Car Smart was purposefully availing itself of the privileges and protections of doing business in Texas.  This availment should have alerted Car Smart to the possibility that it might be haled into court in Texas to answer complaints related to this extended contractual relationship.  Although Car Smart argues to the contrary, the continuation of the relationship between the parties for over four years, combined with Car Smart’s decision to enter into 28 agreements with Santander, suggests otherwise.

Santander is represented by Donald Hill of Rowlett Hill LLP.  Car Smart is represented by Darrell Guthrie, Greg Dimmick, and Lawrence Doss, all of Mullin Hoard & Brown.

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Magistrate Judge Cureton

Magistrate Judge Cureton became one of the Northern District’s magistrate judges in 2010.  He graduated from Baylor University in 1990 and Baylor University School of Law in 1993, where he was a member of the Baylor Law Review.  Following law school, Judge Cureton clerked for Judge Mahon of the Northern District of Texas (from 1993-1994 and from 1997-2000).  After his first clerkship, Judge Cureton was an associate with Friedman, Young and Suder, P.C. from 1994-1995.  He then served the Forth Worth community as an Assistant District Attorney in Tarrant County.  Following his stint as an Assistant District Attorney and his second clerkship, Judge Cureton was an associate with the Fillmore Law Firm from 2000-2003.  From 2003-2010, Judge Cureton was a partner with the Fort Worth law firm of Cureton & Gordon.

Judge Cureton has also served as an adjunct professor at Texas Wesleyan School of Law, where he taught courses in the area of litigation and trial technique.

Judge Cureton sits in the Northern District’s Fort Worth Division, and his initial term runs through 2018.

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Judge Fish Remands Tran v. Citibank (For the Second Time)

Judge Fish recently issued an order in Tran v. Citibank, sending the case back to state court for the second time.  The plaintiff, Dr. Tran, originally brought suit in state court claiming that Citibank failed to honor his decision to rescind a transaction associated with his medical practice (Dr. Tran purchased electronic equipment for use in his practice, which, according to Dr. Tran, was defective) and, instead, associated with defendant GC Services, a debt collection agency, to collect the debt from him.  Dr. Tran originally brought suit in state court, alleging a violation of, among other things, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Citibank removed the case to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.  The case, however, was remanded after Dr. Tran dismissed all of his federal claims.  Following remand, the state court ordered the parties to mediate.  During the mediation, Dr. Tran made an oral demand of more than $87,000 to settle his case.  Citibank then removed the case a second time–this time on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.

Dr. Tran filed a motion to remand, arguing that Citibank’s removal was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (because the removal was filed “more than 1 year after commencement of the action”) and asserting that Citibank was “prohibited from using the oral ‘communication’ relating to the action ‘made by a participant in an alternative dispute resolution procedure’ to prove diversity jurisdiction under the Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 154.073(a)[,]” which provides, with certain exceptions, that “a communication relating to the subject matter of any civil or criminal dispute made by a participant in an alternative dispute resolution procedure . . . is confidential, is not subject to disclosure, and may not be used as evidence against the participant in any judicial or administrative proceeding.”

Judge Fish ultimately found that the one-year time limit of § 1446(b) barred removal, and remanded the case to state court again.  Judge Fish’s decision did, however, raise three interesting issues.  First, Judge Fish noted, with respect to the oral settlement communication, that it was unclear whether this oral communication could satisfy § 1446(b)’s requirement that the notice of removal be filed within thirty days “after receipt by the defendant . . . of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable[.]”  Judge Fish noted that, “[a]lmost without exception, [courts] have held that the paper required in [section] 1446 must be a part of the underlying suit rather than an outside development in removal jurisdiction.”

The second interesting issue raised by the decision (but not decided by Judge Fish) is whether the oral settlement communication made at the parties’ mediation could be used to demonstrate that the case’s amount in controversy was over $75,000, as is necessary for diversity jurisdiction to exist.  It seems unclear whether Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 154.073(a) makes such communications inadmissible in federal court.  Until the courts have sorted this issue out, it may be best to enter into a separate mediation agreement that specifically provides that no party shall use communications occurring in mediation for any purpose, including to establish diversity jurisdiction.

Third, Judge Fish noted that, in certain instances, the one-year time limit in § 1446(b) may be equitably tolled in cases involving a clear pattern of forum manipulation.  In the instant case, however, Judge Fish concluded that Citibank had failed to demonstrate that the one-year time limit should be equitably tolled.

Carl Adams, of The Law Offices of Carl Adams, represents Dr. Tram.  Citibank is represented by Evan Moeller, of Hirsch & Westheimer PC, Brian Morris and Leslie Johnson, both of Winstead PC, and Citibank in-house counsel David Winston.

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Meeting and Conferring (Fully)

Local Rule 7.1(a) requires that, “[b]efore filing a motion [with limited exceptions], an attorney for the moving party must confer with an attorney for each party affected by the requested relief to determine whether the motion is opposed.”  In Marshall d/b/a Mr. Crappie v. Fulton, Judge Lindsay dealt with a motion to extend discovery and counterclaims, as well as Mr. Crappie’s request for sanctions against Fulton.  Judge Lindsay stated, with respect to the Local Rules’ meet and confer requirement:   

[T]he court considers Marshall’s request for sanctions against Fulton.  The evidence presented by Plaintiff establishes that Defendant did not fully confer with him before filing this motion as required by Local Rule 7.1(a), because he did not raise all the requested relief in that conference.  The court will not sanction Fulton; however, he is admonished to comply with the Local Rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Failure to comply with these rules in the future will lead to sanctions.

This decision servies as a useful reminder that, when conducting a meet and confer pursuant to the Local Rules, make sure to raise all of the issues that you plan to cover in your motion.  Failure to do so could result in sanctions. 

Note that while we were initially confused as to what exactly “Mr. Crappie” was, we have determined that it is a business that sells fishing rods.  Check out its website here, including the Crappie Mobile

The case involves the use of the “Mr. Crappie” trademark.  Mr. Crappie is represented by Darin Klemchuk, Katherine Bandy, and Kelly Kubasta, all of Klemchuk Kubasta LLP.  Fulton is represented by Stephen Kennedy, of Kennedy Clark & Williams PC, and Zachary Groover of Munck Carter LLP.

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