Rutherford Federal Rules Amendments CLE (Part 3)

This post concludes our discussion of Rebecca Rutherford’s CLE on the amended federal rules, presented on June 2, 2015. Our first post, covering the changes to Rule 26, can be found here. Our second post, addressing the changes to Rule 37, can be found here. This post addresses the remaining amendments.

Briefly, the remaining Rule amendments include:

  • Rule 1 is amended to state that the parties share responsibility to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”
  • Rule 4(m) shortens the time to serve the summons from 120 days to 90 days.
  • Rule 16(b)(2) shortens the time for the Court to issue a scheduling order from 90 days to 60 days.
  • Rule 16(b)(3) includes additional suggestions for the Court to include in its scheduling orders: (i) ESI preservation clauses, (ii) FRE 502 clawback provisions, and (iii) meet-and-confer requirements before discovery motions.
  • Rule 55(c) is amended to state that Rule 60(b) may be used against final default judgments.
  • Rule 84 removes all forms from the Rules.

A few thoughts from Ms. Rutherford:

  • Rule 16(b)(2) (shortening time for the Court to issue a scheduling order) has a good-cause exception. Ms. Rutherford suggested that this exception may be easy to satisfy—the committee suggested that “complex issues” or “multiple parties” could justify extending the deadline.
  • The Northern District already requires the parties to meet and confer before filing a discovery motion.
  • Ms. Rutherford said that the amendments also encourage courts and parties to consider having scheduling conferences by telephone or videoconference, with the aim of saving time.
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Judge Lynn Limits Defendant to 30 Prior Art References

In Mobile Telecommunications Technologies v. Blackberry, Judge Lynn entered an Order (available here) limiting the defendant to 30 prior art references in its opening expert report. The Order was without prejudice to defendant seeking leave to assert more than 30 references upon a showing of good cause.

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Judge Kinkeade Invalidates Patent On Motion to Dismiss Under Alice

On May 7, 2015, Judge Kinkeade entered an Order (available here) in Jericho Systems v. Axiomatics finding that the plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed at the pleadings stage because the patent in suit did not claim patent eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and the Supreme Court’s recent Alice decision.

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Judge Godbey Denies Motion to Stay Patent Case Pending Inter Partes Review

On June 17, 2015, Judge Godbey issued an Order (available here) in Lakesouth v. Ace Evert. The Order denied the defendants’ motion to stay pending inter partes review. Judge Godbey found the fact that the patent in suit already went through an eight year reexamination to weigh against a stay, as did the nearly one year delay in requesting IPR, that one of the defendants was not a party to the IPR, and that trial will be set for January 2016.

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Judge Means Rules That Allcare Owes Highmark Over $5 Million For Losing Patent Infringement Case

On June 23, 2015, following a trip up to the Supreme Court, Judge Means ordered patent holder Allcare to pay accused infringer Highmark over $5 million (decision available here). Judge Means concluded that the case was “exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. § 285, thereby justifying an award of attorney’s fees. As a basis for the decision, Judge Means wrote:

The factual findings supporting the Court’s observation, which were not disturbed on appeal, are more than sufficient to support an exceptional-case finding under the standard announced in Octane. In particular, the Court found that Allcare: (1) failed to perform an adequate pre-filing investigation into its infringement claims, (2) ignored information it learned pre-filing about Highmark’s system that cast doubt on Allcare’s claims of infringement, (3) maintained its infringement claims well after such claims had been shown by its own experts to be without merit and for the express purpose of maintaining leverage against Highmark, (4) used a phony informational survey to identify Highmark and other companies as targets from which licensing fees could be demanded and litigation threatened, (5) asserted meritless defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel that its attorneys knew to be frivolous, (6) shifted its claim construction without leave of Court and after the deadline set out in this Court’s scheduling order, and (7) made misrepresentations to the Western District of Pennsylvania in connection with the transfer of the case to this Court. 

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Magistrate Judge Horan’s Heller v. City of Dallas Opinion: Laying Down the Law With Respect to Discovery Responses

Late last year, Magistrate Judge Horan issued a 62 page opinion (available here) in Heller v. City of Dallas, 303 F.R.D. 466 (N.D. Tex. 2014). The opinion is notable in many respects, as it provides important guidelines that should be followed when responding to discovery requests in the Northern District of Texas. Below are what I believe to be the highlights of the decision (which should be read in full by those practicing in the Northern District of Texas). Many of the practices criticized in the opinion will come as a surprise to many if not most attorneys practicing in the Northern District of Texas (including those who will remain nameless!).

General Discovery Obligations

Judge Horan noted:

  • Counsel have “an obligation, as officers of the court, to assist in the discovery process by making diligent, good-faith responses to legitimate discovery requests.”
  • Rule 26(g) was enacted “to eliminate one of the most prevalent of all discovery abuses: kneejerk discovery requests served without consideration of cost or burden to the responding party.” It was also enacted “to bring an end to the equally abusive practice of objecting to discovery requests reflexively—but not reflectively—and without a factual basis.” Rule 26(g) “and its commentary are starkly clear: an objection to requested discovery may not be made until after a lawyer has paused and consider[ed] whether, based on a reasonable inquiry, there is a factual basis [for the] . . . objection.”

General, Generic Objections (Otherwise Known As “Boilerplate” Objections) Are Not Permitted And Are Invalid

Judge Horan stated:

  • General, generic objections violate the Federal Rules and are invalid. Objections to discovery must be made with specificity, and the responding party has the obligation to explain and support its objections.
  • So-called boilerplate or unsupported objections—even when asserted in response to a specific discovery request and not as part of a general list of generic objections preceding any responses to specific discovery requests—are likewise improper and ineffective and may rise (or fall) to the level of what the Fifth Circuit has described as “an all-too-common example of the sort of ‘Rambo tactics’ that have brought disrepute upon attorneys and the legal system.”
  • Counsel should cease and desist from raising these free-standing and purportedly universally applicable “general objections” in responding to discovery requests. Deploying these general objections in this manner is . . .  inconsistent with the Federal Rules and is not warranted by existing law.

Do Not State That Interrogatory Responses Are Not Admissions And There’s No Need To Reserve The Right To Supplement Interrogatory Responses

With respect to interrogatory responses, Judge Horan held:

  • Disavowing interrogatory responses as “admissions of any nature,” flies in the face of Rule 33(c)’s provision that “[a]n answer to an interrogatory may be used to the extent allowed by the Federal Rules of Evidence.”
  • Any statement reserving the “right” to supplement discovery responses “merely reflects an already existing duty, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e).”

Procedure For Responding to Discovery Requests

Judge Horan stated that the following is a correct statement of how to properly respond to discovery requests:

  • A party served with written discovery must fully answer each interrogatory or document request to the full extent that it is not objectionable and affirmatively explain what portion of an interrogatory or document request is objectionable and why, affirmatively explain what portion of the interrogatory or document request is not objectionable and the subject of the answer or response, and affirmatively explain whether any responsive information or documents have been withheld.
  • “In responding to [Rule 34] discovery requests, a reasonable inquiry must be made, and if no responsive documents or tangible things exist, the responding party should so state with sufficient specificity to allow the Court to determine whether the party made a reasonable inquiry and exercised due diligence.”
  • If responsive documents do exist but the responsive party claims lack of possession, control, or custody, the party must so state with sufficient specificity to allow the Court (1) to conclude that the responses were made after a case-specific evaluation and (2) to evaluate the merit of that response.”
  • To comply with the requirements to support withholding any responsive document or information as privileged or protected work product, a privilege log or equivalent document complying with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(A)’s requirements must be produced for any documents, communications, or other materials withheld from production on the grounds of attorney-client privilege, work product, or other privilege, immunity, or protection. A party may properly raise and preserve an objection to production of documents in response to a specific document request or interrogatory by objecting “to the extent” that the requests seeks privileged materials or work product, so long as the responding party also provides the information required by Rule 26(b)(5)(A).

Do Not Assert Objections And Then Answer “Subject To” or “Without Waiving” The Objections

Judge Horan did not have kind words for this practice:

  • The practice of “respond[ing] to discovery requests by asserting objections and then answering ‘subject to’ or ‘without waiving’ their objections” should “not escape comment and is inextricably intertwined with the related practice of raising boilerplate objections without the specificity that the Federal Rules require and about which Plaintiffs do complain. The practice of asserting objections and then answering ‘subject to’ and/or ‘without waiving’ the objections—like the practice of including a stand-alone list of general or blanket objections that precede any responses to specific discovery requests—may have developed as a reflexive habit passed on from one attorney to another without any attorney giving serious thought or reflection as to what this manner of responding means or could hope to accomplish as to a particular discovery request. Having reflected on it, the Court agrees with judges in this circuit and other jurisdictions that the practice of responding to interrogatories and documents requests ‘subject to’ and/or ‘without waiving’ objections is ‘manifestly confusing (at best) and misleading (at worse), and has no basis at all in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”
  • The Court concludes that, outside of the privilege and work product context as discussed above, responding to a document request or interrogatory “subject to” and “without waiving” objections is not consistent with the Federal Rules or warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.
  • A responding party has a duty to respond to or answer a discovery request to the extent that it is not objectionable. [T]he Federal Rules dictate that a responding party must describe what portions of the interrogatory or document request it is, and what portions it is not, answering or responding to based on its objections and why. But if the request is truly objectionable—that is, the information or documents sought are not properly discoverable under the Federal Rules—the responding party should stand on an objection so far as it goes. If a responding party makes such an objection but answers or responds “subject to” and “without waiving” the objection, “[s]uch objection and answer preserves nothing and serves only to waste the time and resources of both the Parties and the Court.”

Vagueness/Ambiguous Objections

With respect to “vague and ambiguous” objections:

  • [I]f part or all of an interrogatory is allegedly vague and ambiguous, the responding party, to comply with the Federal Rules, must, if possible, explain its understanding of the allegedly vague and ambiguous terms or phrases and explicitly state that its answer is based on that understanding. If an entire interrogatory or document request is truly so vague and ambiguous that the responding party cannot understand its meaning and what information it seeks, the party should stand on its objection and provide no answer at all or promise no production of responsive documents on the ground that the responding party simply cannot do so based on the discovery request’s wording. But making an objection to a request as vague and ambiguous, without more, and then fully answering the interrogatory or promising production of all documents responsive to the request “subject to” the vagueness and ambiguity objection betrays that the objection was made reflexively and without a factual basis.

“Overbroad” Objections

Many times discovery requests are overbroad. In such a situation:

  • If a discovery request is overbroad, the responding party must, to comply with Rule 33 or Rule 34, explain the extent to which it is overbroad and answer or respond to the extent that it is not—and explain the scope of what the responding party is answering or responding to.

“Relevance” Objections

Judge Horan noted what to do if the discovery request seeks irrelevant information:

  • If all or part of a discovery request seeks documents or information not even reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, the responding party should make a specific objection explaining how and to what extent the requested documents or information are not relevant and discoverable under the Rule 26(b) standard and stand on that objection as to the portion of the request that is so objectionable while specifically describing the portion, if any, of the request to which the responding party is answering or producing documents.

Demonstrating That A Discovery Request Is Overly Broad, Unduly Burdensome Or Oppressive

The following showing must be made to demonstrate that a discovery request is overly broad, unduly burdensome or oppressive:

  • A party resisting discovery must show specifically how each interrogatory or document request is overly broad, unduly burdensome, or oppressive. This requires the party resisting discovery to show how the requested discovery was overly broad, unduly burdensome, or oppressive by submitting affidavits or offering evidence revealing the nature of the burden. Failing to do so, as a general matter, makes such an unsupported objection nothing more than unsustainable boilerplate.
  • “The party objecting to discovery as vague or ambiguous has the burden to show such vagueness or ambiguity.” “A party objecting on these grounds must explain the specific and particular way in which a request is vague.” The responding party “should exercise reason and common sense to attribute ordinary definitions to terms and phrases utilized in interrogatories. If necessary to clarify its answers, the responding party may include any reasonable definition of the term or phrase at issue.” Further, “[i]f a party believes that the request is vague, that party [should] attempt to obtain clarification prior to objecting on this ground.”

The “Everyone Else Was Doing It” Defense Won’t Fly

Judge Horan employed a “no excuses” policy to assessing sanctions:

  • It is generally no defense to a Rule 26(g)(3) sanctions request to assert that many litigants and their counsel are similarly conducting themselves in discovery. Rather, that simply highlights the need to call this conduct out when it is presented and to provide a deterrent through a sanction, as the Federal Rules mandate here.

Sanctions Were Assessed

Judge Horan assessed sanctions against the Defendant, requiring it to pay plaintiffs’ reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with Defendant’s objectionable conduct. Judge Horan also ordered all of Defendant’s attorneys who represent Defendant “in litigation in federal court receive [to] review a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order on Discovery Sanctions.” Finally, Judge Horan noted: “The undersigned practiced civil litigation, had substantial experience with propounding and responding to discovery requests, and understands well the difficulties and challenges involved in both. But that experience only serves to make the Court hopeful that this opinion will assist counsel conducting discovery in this case and others going forward.”

(Certain citations and quotations from Judge Horan’s opinion have been omitted).

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Rutherford Federal Rules Amendments CLE (Part 2)

This post continues our discussion of Rebecca Rutherford’s excellent CLE on the amended federal rules, presented on June 2, 2015. Our first post, covering the changes to Rule 26, can be found here. This post addresses the second portion of the CLE, addressing the changes to Rule 37.

Rule 37(e), entitled “Failure to Provide Electronically Stored Information,” has basically been done away with. The new rule is basically split into three parts:

  • First, under Rule 37(e), the moving party must show that the ESI (i) that should have been preserved was lost, (ii) the ESI was lost because the party didn’t take reasonable steps to preserve it, and (iii) the ESI cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery.
  • If Rule 37(e) is satisfied, and the moving party can show prejudice, the Court generally may only “order measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice,” per Rule 37(e)(1).
  • If, however, the non-moving party did not preserve ESI “with the intent to deprive another party of the information’s use in litigation,” the Court may issue much harsher sanctions under Rule 37(e)(2): (i) presume that the lost information was unfavorable to the party, (ii) instruct the jury that it may or must presume the information was unfavorable to the party, or (iii) dismiss the action or enter a default judgment.

Some thoughts from Ms. Rutherford on the rule change:

  • Before the amendment from the rule, the circuits were split on the appropriate response to ESI spoliation. The Second Circuit, for example, would impose harsh sanctions for negligent destruction of ESI, while the Fifth Circuit reserved harsh sanctions for intentional destruction of ESI.
  • The rule change is intended to displace all other authority to impose sanctions for ESI spoliation, including the Court’s inherent authority and state-law bases. The rule change, however, will not cover spoliation of non-ESI documents or tangible things—those will be covered by common-law spoliation principles.
  • Ms. Rutherford discussed some possible remedial measures that a Court could consider under 37(e)(1): (i) forbid a party from presented certain evidence, (ii) tell the jury about the spoliation, (iii) a curative instruction from the court, or (iv) the award of fees. A court may not, however, impose any sanctions listed in Rule 37(e)(2) when determining “necessary” measures under Rule 37(e)(1).
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If You Hire “Cadillac” Counsel, Don’t Expect The Court To Require Your Opponent To Fully Reimburse You

That’s the lesson coming out of the Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy decision (available here) from the Southern District of New York. The general “American Rule” is that a successful litigant is not entitled to recover its attorney’s fees from its opponent absent a contractual or statutory right to recover such fees. In Beastie Boys, the Beastie Boys prevailed at trial on their copyright infringement and Lanham Act claims. Both the Copyright and Lanham Act provide for the recovery of attorney’s fees in certain instances. The Beastie Boys sought to recover $2.3 million in attorney’s fees from the defendant (Monster) for what the Court described as “flagrant” copyright infringement.

The Court ultimately only awarded $667,000, slashing amounts relating to time spent on “tenuous[ly] relevant discovery,” defending a “problematic aspect” of an expert’s report, an “unsuccessful Daubert challenge to one of Monster’s expert witnesses,” “abandoned” claims, and the decision of the Court not to award attorney’s fees on the Lanham Act claim. The Court also noted that there was “partner-heavy staffing” with the firm billing “nearly 2.5 times as many partner hours as associate hours” (the partners billed out at $675/hour, with associates ranging from $505-325/hour).

“Here, the Court’s review of [the firm’s] bills suggests that the Beastie Boys opted to pay for, and received, the Cadillac Escalade, not the Honda Civic.” The court applied a 30% across the board reduction, then reduced the amount by another 20% to reflect work relating to the Lanham Act claim. This left a $1.3 million fee. The Court then slashed this number by 50% in considering “the extent to which a fee award here would further the goals of the Copyright Act,” to come to the $667,000 final award. (This amount was tacked onto the $1.2 million damages award against Monster, plus the amounts Monster had to pay for its own attorneys).

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Rutherford Federal Rules Amendments CLE (Part 1)

Last Tuesday, Rebecca Rutherford gave a CLE on the upcoming amendments to the Federal Rules (which, absent congressional action, will take effect in December 2015). Ms. Rutherford is a former law clerk of former Magistrate Judge Kaplan, a current law clerk of Magistrate Judge Stickney, and a future law clerk of Judge Lynn. Given her experience, we thought her take on these amendments was worth sharing:

As an overview, Ms. Rutherford stated that the 2015 amendments (also known as the “Duke Rules Package”) generally encourages cooperation between the parties and active judicial management, with an eye towards lowering the expenses of federal litigation.

This post covers the first third of Ms. Rutherford’s presentation, on the amendments to Rule 26. We’ll cover the other portions of her CLE in future posts.

The key change to Rule 26 was 26(b)(1), covering discovery scope and limits. The rule no longer allows discovery into “any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action” or anything “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence”—those phrases have been stricken from the rules. Instead, discovery must be relevant and proportional to the needs of the case. The rule lays out proportionality factors (which were originally part of Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(3)) to consider in determining whether the discovery is “proportional to the needs of the case.”

Some thoughts from Ms. Rutherford on the proportionality factors:

  • Ms. Rutherford stated that the purpose of the amendment was to limit discovery, especially given the proliferation of electronically stored information. The drafters saw the previous standard (especially the “reasonably calculated” phrasing) as too inclusive.
  • Ms. Rutherford believes that courts will place emphasis on the fifth factor—“the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.” If you’re moving to compel, you really need to be able to articulate the benefit of the discovery you’re seeking.
  • For parties resisting motions to compel, Ms. Rutherford suggests quantifying the expense—she believes it’s easier for courts to consider concrete numbers. (That said, Ms. Rutherford suggested that parties should refrain from overestimating the expense of complying with discovery. Courts have a long memory, and you’ll lose credibility if your estimates are off.)

A few other changes to Rule 26:

  • Rule 26(c)(1)(B) now allows courts to allocate expenses when ruling on a motion for protective order.
  • Rule 26(d)(2) allows parties to serve requests for production early, before the Rule 26(f) conference. Ms. Rutherford explained a benefit from serving early requests for production—parties can better discuss potential document-production issues early, for early consideration by the Court (if needed).
  • Rule 34(b)(2) adds important new rules for discovery responses. Objections must be stated with specificity, you must state whether documents have been withheld based on the objections, and you must state the date that you intend to provide your document production.

Some thoughts from Ms. Rutherford on the changes to Rule 26:

  • Ms. Rutherford believes that Courts are already considering motions to compel under the principles of the amended rules, and stated that parties should be prepare to litigate existing cases under the new rules on December 1. She suggested reviewing Heller v. City of Dallas, 303 F.R.D. 466 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (which incorporated many of the principles of the amended rules) as an example on how to object and respond to discovery in the Northern District. (We will be dedicating a separate, upcoming post to Heller, as it is a very important decision).
  • Ms. Rutherford stated that the committee notes suggested how to deal with a rolling document production—that a litigant should state when it intends to start and finish producing responsive documents. Ms. Rutherford suggested that litigants moving to compel, in response, should not move until after the “finish” date has past, as the documents likely haven’t been produced yet.
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Judiciary Appreciation Luncheon (June 19, 2015)

The Northern District of Texas has sent the following announcement regarding a free CLE event on Friday, June 19, 2015:

All attorneys and support staff are cordially invited to attend the annual Judiciary Appreciation Luncheon, which is sponsored by the Federal Bar Association and the Judiciary Committee of the Dallas Bar Association. The luncheon will be held on Friday, June 19, 2015, at the Pavilion of the Belo Mansion from noon until 1:30 p.m. Judge Carl Stewart, Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, will be the luncheon speaker. The luncheon has been approved for 1.0 hour of continuing legal education credit by the State Bar of Texas.

Although the event is free, attendees will be responsible for their own meal and parking expenses, if any. Also, preregistration is required by June 12, 2015. Register on the TXND website at: http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/index.html

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