On August 14, 2013, Chief Judge Fitzwater issued an opinion (available here) in Estate of Juan Benitez v. Sears, a case involving the workplace death of a Sears employee. Sears moved to compel arbitration.
According to Chief Judge Fitzwater:
Sears has a Texas Injury Benefit Plan (the “Plan”) that applies to employee accidents and injuries—including deaths—that occur in the course and scope of an employee’s work. It is undisputed that Juan’s electronic signature was used online to acknowledge that he had completed training that consisted of viewing an in-person PowerPoint presentation and separately watching a DVD that was available in English and Spanish. The PowerPoint presentation and the DVD both covered the Plan and its requirements, including the mandatory arbitration clause. Juan was also provided a hard copy of the Plan, and a Spanish interpreter was available during the training session.
Plaintiffs contended that the Federal Arbitration Act does not apply because the decedent was a transportation worker.
The FAA “compels judicial enforcement of a wide range of written arbitration agreements.” But it provides that “nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 1. This provision exempts employment contracts with workers who “actually engage[] in the movement of goods in interstate commerce.”
Sears put forth evidence that the decedent’s position did not require him to engage in the movement of goods in interstate commerce. The estate attempted to put forth contrary evidence:
On the other hand, Conce avers that Juan loaded and unloaded trucks in a warehouse, and, specifically, that he “drove a three-wheeled truck and/or forklift to move goods on and off trucks that were shipped and delivered to and from the warehouse[.]” Ps. Ex. A at 1. Sears objects to this evidence, contending that it is hearsay and that Conce lacks personal knowledge of Juan’s work duties. The court agrees that Conce’s affidavit fails to demonstrate personal knowledge, as Fed. R. Evid. 602 requires. See id. (“A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.”). Conce’s affidavit states “I have personal knowledge of the facts herein,” Ps. Ex. A at 1, but it does not include factual support to show that Conce possesses such knowledge, including, for example, the source of such personal knowledge. Mere assertions that an affiant’s testimony is based on personal knowledge are insufficient. Because there is no allegation that Conce worked at Sears or otherwise observed Juan at work, Conce’s testimony is likely based on hearsay. The court therefore declines to consider Conce’s affidavit insofar as it describes Juan’s duties as a Sears employee.
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
The estate then contested the validity of the arbitration agreement, arguing that “because Juan was computer illiterate, could not read or write English, and had little formal education in Spanish, the court cannot find that he agreed to the arbitration agreement.” Although Sears contested this, the Court declined “to reach this issue because plaintiffs’ challenge to validity attacks the entire agreement, not the arbitration agreement specifically, and therefore is a question for the arbitrator to decide.”
Accordingly, Chief Judge Fitzwater granted Sears’ motion to compel arbitration.