CCRG’s First Texas Business Court Case

Our first case in the newly created Texas Business Court didn’t last long. We filed a Special Appearance and Motion to Dismiss, and Plaintiffs bailed on the case. A couple of thoughts about the experience:

1. Judge Whitehill doesn’t mess around. Trial dates in 1-year, monthly status conferences, prompt hearings, scheduling conferences, protective orders, case schedules, extremely active case manager, etc.

2. The Business Court has a mandate from the Texas legislature to provide for quick and efficient resolutions of significant business disputes to, among other things, eliminate the expense and significant delays (e.g., 3–6-year time to trial) that are found in many Texas jurisdictions.

    3. I was very impressed by the process. Please file all of your business cases here in Dallas.

    4. The case was assigned to Judge Whitehill, one of the two Business Court judges here in Dallas.

    5. Business Court Rule 4(b), which requires, e.g., a “list [of] the names of opposing law firms and/or counsel in the case” should be updated to remove this requirement. Nobody is going to serve supplemental disclosures every time a new attorney appears in the case, and that information should be reflected on the docket anyways. Or, if they are filed, they will clog the docket.

      Posted in Dallas Legal Community | Comments Off on CCRG’s First Texas Business Court Case

      Does Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Require Attorneys To Interrogate Declarants On Whether They Used AI To Draft Their Declarations?

      A Stanford professor has fessed up to drafting expert declaration with AI and including fake citations in it. “The Court suggests that an ‘inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b), may now require attorneys to ask their witnesses whether they have used AI in drafting their declarations and what they have done to verify any AI-generated content.” Really?

      Absent wild red flags, I’d hope that subjecting oneself to felony perjury charges (and 5 years in prison) would do the trick to weed out manufactured citations in the declaration (that, of course, can’t be “true and correct” and “based on personal knowledge”).

      Attorneys should be entitled to rely, as a matter of course, on the jurat meaning something. We have enough to keep us up at night without subjecting ourselves to Rule 11 sanctions if we take declarants at their word (especially professors and other highly educated expert witnesses).

      Posted in Developing Law, Ethics, Non-N.D. Tex. Notable Decisions, Practice Tips | Comments Off on Does Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Require Attorneys To Interrogate Declarants On Whether They Used AI To Draft Their Declarations?

      On Improper Redactions

      Judge Chhabria, who suffers no fools, caught Meta/Facebook trying to do some improper redactions (“preposterous” redactions at that), issues warning (including to counsel) that Meta may be on the road to getting sanctioned like the last time around when he popped Meta and its counsel (to the tune of nearly $1 million for discovery abuses). Sealing requests designed to “avoid negative publicity” aren’t appropriate.

      I know how this happens:

      Outside Counsel, to Inhouse Counsel [all of whom I love dearly]: “What should we file under seal?”

      Inhouse Counsel: “Everything.”

      Outside Counsel: “While I’m not 100% sure, and you may be right that we can, I don’t think we can do that.”

      Inhouse Counsel: “Everything that isn’t already publicly shown on page 1 of Google or that could make us look bad. Redact quotations in parentheticals if it would disclose our legal arguments in this case. I don’t want this filing making the news and the executive team coming to me and asking why this was public.”

      Outside Counsel: “Sounds good, we’ll give it a shot.”

      Sometimes it works, sometimes it’ll get you a show cause order.

      Posted in Non-N.D. Tex. Notable Decisions, Practice Tips | Comments Off on On Improper Redactions

      Patent Pilot Program To Expire In July 2021

      The patent pilot program expires by operation of law on July 4, 2021, so Chief Judge Lynn issued an order (available here) vacating Special Order No. 3-287 (which set forth the prior procedure for assigning judges to patent cases under the patent pilot program). After July 4, 2021, all district court judges in the N.D. Tex. will handle patent-infringement cases.

      Posted in Judge Lynn, N.D. Tex. News | Comments Off on Patent Pilot Program To Expire In July 2021

      Repeat Copyright Plaintiff (Who Is Also Attorney Who Represents Himself) Hit With $172,173 Award For Losing Copyright Case

      Everyone loves a good man-bites-dog story. This is the story of an attorney who took pictures of the Indianapolis skyline and filed dozens of lawsuits accusing defendants of copyright infringement. The story didn’t end well for the attorney.

      The jury found that the attorney did not prove he authored the photo, owned its copyright, and registered it with the Copyright Office (it appears as if the jury could’ve found that the attorney took the photo as a work made for hire for his prior law firm). Judgment was thus entered for Defendant Carmen Commercial Real Estate Services. Defendant then moved for attorney’s fees and costs.

      The Court hit the attorney with $172,173 in fees and costs (decision available here). The Court found that the attorney’s position on ownership was not unreasonable, but his position on damages was a different matter.

      Similar licenses to images went for $5 to $200. The attorney testified at trial that he typically licensed the photograph for $200. In a prior case, after prevailing at trial, he was awarded $200 in statutory damages. The attorney testified at trial that his “actual damages are probably $200.”

      The Defendant offered to settle, pre-suit, for $1,000. But the attorney proceeded to trial seeking $150,000 in statutory damages “on scant evidence of willful infringement.”

      This the Court did not like:

      [The attorney] has filed many lawsuits over this photograph. Other judges have found indicia of improper motive: “[The attorney’s] motivation for filing this action appears to be an attempt to extract quick, small settlements from many defendants instead of using the judicial process to protect his copyright against legitimate infringing actors.” . . . .

      Here, the record similarly reflects that [the attorney] used the threat of litigation costs to extract quick settlements. In his initial $5,000 settlement demand, [the attorney] wrote:

      If not settled by noon May 9th, all offers will be withdrawn[,] and any settlement offers will be substantially higher, as you are responsible for statutory damages, costs, and the copyright holder’s legal fees.

      In response to Defendant’s offer to settle for $1,000, [the attorney] wrote:

      The infringer is liable for statutory damages, plus copyright holder’s attorney fees and costs, which is substantially more than $5,000. Suit will be filed May 9th, 20[1]6. If you wish to avoid legal action, deleting the photo without payment is not an option. You still owe $5,000 for past unauthorized use. Should the $5,000 not be paid by noon May 9th, 20[1]6, [the attorney] will be filing a lawsuit against Carmen Commercial Real Estate Services for copyright infringement. Once the lawsuit is filed, fees and costs go up and Carmen Commercial Real Estate Services will not be able to settle the case for $5,000. It will cost substantially more.

      Not looking good for our hero. (In general, it’s never a good idea to say, “My offer is $X. If you don’t accept it, it’ll go up.” Because nobody will believe you and that’s generally not the way things work.) Ultimately, the Court awarded the Defendant attorney’s fees and costs totaling $172,173.06.

      A few items to reflect upon:

      • If you’re an attorney, going into the copyright lawsuit game as a plaintiff probably isn’t a good idea. 172,173 reasons not to do so here.
      • If your photo generally sells for $200, it’s probably not a good idea to seek $150,000 in damages at trial. That just may be a good way for the jury to pour you out on liability.
      • Always be careful of what you say in your settlement communications. The Court clearly didn’t like the pre-suit demand that, if the claim wasn’t settled, the attorney would have to be paid more post-lawsuit.
      Posted in Attorney's Fees, Non-N.D. Tex. Notable Decisions | Comments Off on Repeat Copyright Plaintiff (Who Is Also Attorney Who Represents Himself) Hit With $172,173 Award For Losing Copyright Case

      Federal Circuit to W.D. Tex.: Court Congestion Not Enough To Justify Keeping Case On Transfer Motion

      So holds the Federal Circuit in its July 28, 2020 decision in In re Adobe Inc. (available here) issuing a writ of mandamus directing the Western District of Texas to transfer a patent case brought against Adobe to the Northern District of California. In In re Adobe, the defendant Adobe was located in San Jose, California and the plaintiff located in Delaware. Adobe sought transfer to the Northern District of California, noting that its witnesses were in the Northern District of California, as was the inventor and his company which had assigned the patents to the plaintiff.

      The district court denied Adobe’s motion. The single factor weighing in favor of retaining the case was the “court congestion” factor.

      The Federal Circuit found that the district court committed “several errors.” It “failed to accord the full weight of the convenience factors it considered and weighed in favor of transfer.” The district court also “overlooked that the willing witness factor also favored transferring the case.” Third, the district court “ran afoul of governing precedent in giving dispositive weight to its ability to more quickly schedule a trial.”

      As the Western District of Texas has recently become the number 1 venue for patent-infringement lawsuits in the United States, one could expect that In re Adobe will result in more cases being transferred out of the Western District of Texas.

      Posted in Federal Circuit Court of Appeals | Comments Off on Federal Circuit to W.D. Tex.: Court Congestion Not Enough To Justify Keeping Case On Transfer Motion

      Supreme Court Holds That Booking.Com May Be A Trademark

      On June 30, 2020, the Supreme Court issued its decision in USPTO v. Booking.Com (available here). The Court rejected the PTO’s suggested rule that “[t]he combination of a generic word and ‘.com’ is generic.” Because consumers do not perceive the term “Booking.com” to “signify online hotel-reservation services as a class[,]” it is eligible for federal trademark registration. Per the Court:

      While we reject the rule proffered by the PTO that “generic.com” terms are generic names, we do not embrace a rule automatically classifying such terms as nongeneric. Whether any given “generic.com” term is generic, we hold, depends on whether consumers in fact perceive that term as the name of a class or, instead, as a term capable of distinguishing among members of the class.

      Posted in U.S. Supreme Court | Comments Off on Supreme Court Holds That Booking.Com May Be A Trademark

      Post-Judgment Discovery Revealing Party As Judgment-Proof Shell Company Warrants Re-Opening Case And Joining New Parties (Including Party’s Owners and Law Firm)

      On March 23, 2021, the Northern District of Texas entered a decision in SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC (available here). In the case, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings asserting that all of the claims of the patent-in-suit were invalid because they did not meet the subject matter requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101. While the case was on appeal, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to find the case exceptional under 35 U.S.C. § 285 and awarded Plaintiff its reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees. The Federal Circuit affirmed. In post-judgment discovery, Plaintiff found that Defendant is judgment proof and operated as a shell company.

      Plaintiff argued that the Court should re-open the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) for newly discovered evidence, for fraud or misconduct, and under a general catch-all provision. The Court agreed based on the newly discovered evidence: “This post-judgment evidence indicates that [Defendant] is a sham or shell entity that is designed and intended to avoid liability. . . . [This evidence] is more than sufficient to meet [Plaintiff’s] burden with respect to setting aside the judgment. . . . [This evidence] is material and likely would have produced a different result if before the Court at the time the final judgment and related ordered were entered.” The Court noted that Plaintiff had asked to find two individuals liable for attorney’s fees who had ownership interests in Defendant and allegedly made the case exceptional, but the Court declined under the mistaken belief that a judgment against Defendant would flow through to these individuals.

      Plaintiff further argued that the Court should allow joinder under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 19 and 20 of (i) parties with an ownership interest in Defendant and (ii) Defendant’s law firm who was responsible for making the case exceptional. The Court agreed to join the majority of the requested parties under both Rules.

      In regards to the parties with an ownership interest in Defendant:

      As for Rule 19, joinder is necessary because in the absence of joinder, [Plaintiff] would be forced to take action against these parties in another manner, which would possibly subject [Plaintiff] to double, multiple, or inconsistent results. Without joinder of these parties with an ownership interest, [Plaintiff] would not be able to seek complete relief. Joinder is also permissible under Rule 20. [Plaintiff] seeks joint, several, or alternative liability against these parties as they all have an ownership interest in [Defendant] and [Plaintiff] intends to attempt to pierce [Defendant’s] corporate veil. The claims will involve overlapping questions of law and fact. Each of these parties has an ownership interest in [Defendant] and allegedly had a hand in establishing and operating [Defendant] as a judgment-proof company.

      In regards to Defendant’s law firm:

      The Court also finds that they, along with [Defendant’s law firm], are proper and necessary parties under Rule 19 and Rule 20 based on their alleged actions causing this case to be exceptional. [Plaintiff’s] asserted claim is that each of these parties should be held liable for attorneys’ fees under § 285. Without joinder of these parties, [Plaintiff] is unable to seek full relief from [Defendant]. Joinder of a party who is an active participant in the alleged wrong-doing is proper and necessary under Rule 19. [citation omitted]. In addition, joinder under Rule 20 is also proper because the claims against each of these parties asserts liability jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transactions, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and have overlapping questions of both law and fact.

      Posted in Attorney's Fees, Developing Law, Judge Kinkeade | Comments Off on Post-Judgment Discovery Revealing Party As Judgment-Proof Shell Company Warrants Re-Opening Case And Joining New Parties (Including Party’s Owners and Law Firm)

      Federal Circuit Requires Stay Until Transfer Ruling (Part 2)

      On March 8, 2021, the Federal Circuit issued an order in In re: Tracfone Wireless, Inc. (available here). This order is another Federal Circuit decision directing W.D. Tex.’s Judge Albright to stay a case pending the resolution of a motion to transfer venue. The Federal Circuit held that proceeding with the case (including through a claim-construction hearing) while a motion to transfer was pending constituted an abuse of discretion.

      Two additional points to note: (i) the Federal Circuit directed the district court to issue a ruling (that provides a reasoned basis) within 30 days and (ii) indicated that “any familiarity that [the district court] has gained with the underlying litigation due to the progress of the case since the filing of the complaint is irrelevant when considering the transfer motion and should not color its decision.” This decision will likely result in more defendants filing motions to transfer venue, regardless of their likelihood of success, as the motion will likely result in the case schedule being slowed down.

      Posted in Developing Law, Federal Circuit Court of Appeals | Comments Off on Federal Circuit Requires Stay Until Transfer Ruling (Part 2)

      “Highly Sensitive” Documents May Be Filed Offline

      In the wake of a large-data breach of the federal courts case management system, the Northern District of Texas Bankruptcy Court entered General Order 2021-02 (available here). The order provides for offline filing of “highly sensitive documents”— documents “containing classified information relating to matters of national security, foreign sovereign interests, or cybersecurity; disclosing protected intellectual property or trade secrets; or involving the reputational interests of the United States.” To file such a document, a party must first electronically file a motion to treat the document as a highly sensitive document, deliver the document to Court, and await an order granting the motion. A party (or the Court on its own motion) may also move to remove highly sensitive information from CM/ECF.

      Posted in N.D. Tex. News | Comments Off on “Highly Sensitive” Documents May Be Filed Offline